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Abstract Business succession is one of the primary
management challenges for family firms. However, many
family firms fail at this task because of financial issues.
Although a vast number of studies have investigated the
succession process, research thus far has failed to
determine how and why family firms select particular
forms of financing for succession-related expenditures.
Accordingly, this study conceptually and empirically
investigates succession financing. We introduce a con-
ceptual framework that investigates the reasons behind an
owner-manager’s intent to use debt for succession
financing. Specifically, our model accounts for general
and succession-related personal factors. However, we also
include a set of firm-specific financing behavioral controls
in our research. The empirical results are derived from a
sample of 187 German family firms, and the results
highlight financial knowledge, attitudes, succession expe-
rience, and succession planning as significant determi-
nants of the owner-managers’ debt usage intentions. The
implications and avenues for future research are discussed.
Keywords Family firms  Succession 
Decision making  Debt financing
JEL Classifications G32  L26
1 Introduction
Business succession is a critical event within the life
cycle of a family firm because it affects the firm’s
performance, the firm’s value, and, potentially, the
firm’s survival (e.g., Diwisch et al. 2009; Bennedsen
et al. 2007). However, most family firms fail at the
challenge of managing a successful business succession
(e.g., Miller et al. 2003). The need for financing is a
common impediment that prevents successful succes-
sion outcomes for family firms (De Massis et al. 2008).
These financing needs mainly arise from transaction
costs. For example, there may be taxes or compensation
payments to the incumbent, other family members or
heirs; additionally, realignment and restructuring costs
could be incurred, which place serious constraints on the
family’s and firm’s resources. Insufficient or inappro-
priate financing and financial structuring can impede
succession or constrain the family firm’s future growth.
For these reasons, all other succession management
activities (e.g., succession planning or successor qual-
ification) become redundant if the succession-related
financial requirements are not met. Accordingly, an
understanding of how and why family firms employ a
certain financial source for funding succession-related
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expenditures is essential for the management of a
successful succession.
Given the prevalence of family firms worldwide
(e.g., Burkart et al. 2003), negative succession effects
can extend beyond the family firm, negatively impact-
ing an economy’s productivity and growth. On
average, 690,000 European small- and medium-sized
enterprises1 change hands each year, affecting
2.8 million jobs (European Commission 2006). Thus,
a substantial body of research on family firm succes-
sion has emerged that analyzes succession from
distinct perspectives. Specifically, research has inves-
tigated (1) personal factors, such as the motivations
and characteristics of the predecessor and the succes-
sor (e.g., Sharma and Irving 2005) or the relationships
between the predecessor, the successor, and the family
(e.g., Miller et al. 2003; Morris et al. 1996); (2)
succession process factors, such as succession plan-
ning (e.g., Sharma et al. 2003b); and (3) firm factors,
such as board composition (Dunn 1999). Most empir-
ical studies employ a case study approach and
investigate only a limited number of family firms
(e.g., Miller et al. 2003; Chittoor and Das 2007;
Ibrahim et al. 2001). Moreover, although succession in
family firms involves both management transition
and—sometimes deferred—ownership transition,
most research is exclusively focused on the manage-
ment transitions (e.g., Chittoor and Das 2007; Stavrou
2003). Furthermore, even though additional financial
demands are likely to emerge during the ownership
transition process (De Massis et al. 2008), scientific
research on succession financing decisions is scarce.
Instead, we find several studies that have investigated
the impact of succession on a firm’s financial structure
(e.g., Blanco-Mazagatos et al. 2007; Schulze et al.
2003) in terms of the generational differences in the
respective funding behaviors. Most of the studies in
this field explore the differences in the capital
structures of founder- and descendant-controlled
family firms (e.g., McConaughy et al. 2001), rather
than the financing decisions behind succession. As
such, the important influences of financing decisions
on succession outcomes and the drivers behind these
decisions have generally been disregarded.
Therefore, this paper examines the succession financ-
ing decisions in family firms. Specifically, this paper
draws on insights from the theory of planned behavior
(Ajzen 1991), capital structure choice research (e.g.,
Barton and Gordon 1987; Blanco-Mazagatos et al. 2007)
and succession literature (e.g., Chittoor and Das 2007; De
Massis et al. 2008) to investigate the influence of
personal, succession process-related, and firm factors
on the owner-managers’ succession financing intentions.
Behavioral intentions are the most accurate predictors of
future decision-making behavior (for a review, see
Armitage and Conner 2001), such as debt financing
decisions (Grichnik et al. 2011). Succession financing, in
particular, may cause external financial demands because
the owner-managers and their families usually invest
most of their wealth into the business (Sharma et al.
2003a), and family firms do not possess vast internal
financing capabilities (Kimhi 1997). Family firms gen-
erally prefer debt over equity financing (Gallo et al. 2004)
or even equate external financial sources with debt
financing (Romano et al. 2001). Because anecdotal
evidence suggests that a large number of family firms rely
on debt financing to orchestrate successful successions
(L-Bank 2006), we specifically study the owner-man-
ager’s intention to use external debt for succession
financing. This research is based on a sample of 187
German family firms that were asked to indicate which
financial sources they were most likely to use for
succession financing. Our data were analyzed using a
set of binary logistic regression models.
This paper makes at least three primary contribu-
tions to the family firm succession and management
literature. First, research has only recently begun to
systemize the factors that prevent successful family
firm succession, thereby stressing the importance of an
appropriate financing choice for the transition process
(De Massis et al. 2008). This study therefore adds to
the current debate by introducing and investigating the
first conceptual model of succession financing deci-
sion-making. Second, we contribute to the succession
literature by investigating the process of ownership
transition, which has not been a focus of past research.
Most studies of family firm succession are focused on
the various determinants affecting management tran-
sition (e.g., Chittoor and Das 2007; Stavrou 2003). For
this reason, we also contribute to the literature because
our model simultaneously accounts for the effects of
personal, process and firm factors on financing own-
ership transitions. Third, existing studies on family
1 This is not to say that family firms are fully congruent with
small and medium-sized enterprises; however, most of these
enterprises are, in fact, family firms.
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firm financing generally consider financial decision
making to be primarily driven by firm factors and
theorize that any differences between the decisions of
family and non-family firms are a result of personal
factors (e.g., Gallo et al. 2004; Lo´pez-Gracia and
Sa´nchez-Andu´jar 2007). We contribute to this stream
of literature by showing how non-economic variables,
such as experience, can influence the economic
decision-making behavior in family firms. Therefore,
our results add to the knowledge-based view of the
succession process (Cabrera-Sua´rez et al. 2001)
because we investigate specific forms of knowledge
and experience and their influence on an important
part of the succession process.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section
reviews the relevant succession, psychology and
finance literature to develop the hypotheses for our
conceptual model. The methodology is explained in
the third section and includes sample selection and the
measurements used. Next, the empirical results of the
logistic regression analyses are presented. Finally, the
paper concludes with a discussion of the key findings,
followed by the limitations, the avenues for future
research and the concluding remarks.
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 On the desirability of debt financing
within family firm succession: an overarching
framework
This section first briefly defines the common elements
of the family firm succession process and then
provides a theoretical development regarding the
desirability of debt financing within the succession
process.
The literature highlights several important ele-
ments in the intergenerational family firm succession
process:
1. The family firm: Family firms are unique organi-
zational entities that are significantly different
from their non-family counterparts (Chrisman
et al. 2005).2
2. The incumbent (owner-manager): Family firms
are largely dependent on a single decision maker,
the owner-manager (Feltham et al. 2005).
3. The successor: Nepotism, a dominant relational
element in family firms, can lead to the appoint-
ment of unqualified family members as manage-
ment successors over the best qualified professional
managers (Miller 1993).
4. The ownership transfer: Before an orderly transfer
of a family firm from the incumbent to the
successor can take place, the financial implica-
tions of marriage and inheritance laws need to be
carefully considered. As such, ownership transfer
has significant transaction costs (Bjuggren and
Sund 2002).
5. The financing sources for the transaction: Bor-
rowing constraints may affect succession deci-
sions in family firms, as noted by Kimhi (1997).
The financing strategies and capital structure choices
of a family firm are associated with the stage in the life
cycle of the firm. When an owner-manager starts a
business, the financing options are constrained because
financial institutions are unlikely to provide debt
financing when there is no collateral (Williamson
1988). One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that
the early-stage family firm mostly relies on the effort and
skills of the owner-manager, who contributes human
capital to the business. On the family firm’s balance
sheet, such efforts are often reflected by intangible rather
than tangible assets. Intangible assets are difficult to
value. In addition, the time needed to transform an asset
from intangible to tangible can be considerable.
The family firm succession stage is starkly different
from the early stages of the business. At this later stage,
the business has reached a certain maturity that reflects
years of hard work by the owner-manager. The business
has grown and typically has more tangible assets, such
as machines, equipment or real estate. Thus, the family
business reflects the vision for the company of its
owner-manager. Because one of the owner manager’s
biggest worries is that the successor diminishes or
destroys what the owner-manager has accomplished,
he/she has an incentive to retain control of the family
firm as long as possible. Such control can be achieved
either directly or indirectly: (1) Directly by deferring the
passing on of the managerial role to the next generation
or (2) indirectly by choosing a more strategic form of
succession financing. Because the firm is likely to
2 The authors want to acknowledge the vast amount of literature
on CEO-succession in non-family firms. These reviews, how-
ever, are outside the scope of this paper.
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require additional financing to cover succession related
financing needs, the owner-manager must choose an
appropriate financing package.
The need of succession-related financing arises
because the transfer of ownership incurs significant
transaction costs (Bjuggren and Sund 2002). The own-
ership transfer usually involves tax payments, such as
inheritance and income taxes, compensatory payments to
other family members or heirs, and/or payments to the
predecessor, such as purchase prices for ownership
shares. These succession-related financing needs arise
and are in addition to the financial demands of the firm’s
general operating costs. These forms of ownership
transfer are often accompanied by price payments that
are likely to put financial demands on the successor’s
balance sheet that exceed the available private funds.
We posit that the use of debt financing for a family
business transition is desirable for the owner-manager
because of four general personal factors: (1) the
incumbent’s attitude toward debt, (2) the incumbent’s
financial knowledge, (3) the incumbent’s risk propen-
sity, and (4) the incumbent’s experience with debt.
Typically, the top management of a family firm prefers
internal financing to external financing (Modigliani
and Miller 1958; Donaldson 1961; Myers 1984;
Barton and Gordon 1987; Romano et al. 2001) because
it imposes fewer restrictions on the management team.
In contrast, we expect that the owner-manager’s
attitude, particularly toward debt, in the context of
family firm succession financing to be the opposite
because the incumbent perceives restrictions imposed
on the successor as an attractive feature that reduces
the successor’s autonomy (e.g., Myers 1984; Mizruchi
and Brewster Stearns 1994). In addition, in situations
that require substantial amounts of financing, such as
for a family business succession transaction, internally
generated funds might not be sufficient (Blanco-
Mazagatos et al. 2007). According to Pecking Order
Theory, the family firm will prefer debt to equity
(Romano et al. 2001; Gallo et al. 2004). Using debt
financing also provides a cost advantage over using
equity capital, and this advantage is even higher for
private firms, compared to public ones (Brav 2009).
We also expect that financial knowledge is associ-
ated with the owner-manager’s understanding of
financing alternatives and the intention to use debt.
Several surveys have investigated the financial liter-
acy of various population sub-groups (Lusardi and
Mitchell 2008; Lusardi and Tufano 2009). The survey
evidence shows that people aged 65 or older have
lower debt literacy. In contrast, people with higher
incomes have higher debt literacy. A more financially
astute owner-manager is expected to better understand
incentive alignment and possible tax benefits of using
debt to help finance the business transition. A recent
survey shows that entrepreneurs have the greatest
knowledge of common financing alternatives, in
particular bank loans and leasing (Seghers et al.
2012). We therefore argue that it is unlikely that
owner-managers completely lack knowledge of debt
as a financing alternative in the context of family firm
succession. We further expect that prior experience
with debt is associated with the owner-manager’s
intention to use debt. People gain experience with debt
by taking out a student loan, car loan, home mortgage,
or alternative financial services borrowing (Lusardi
and Tufano 2009). We expect that the owner-manager
is less likely to use debt financing for succession
financing when prior bad experiences with such loans
exist. We also expect that the owner-manager’s risk
propensity is associated with the intention to use debt.
We expect that owner-managers with higher risk
aversion are less likely to seek external debt financing.
We posit further that the owner-manager’s inten-
tion to use debt financing is also associated with
succession-related personal factors: (1) the need for
family control, (2) succession planning and (3)
succession experience. We expect that most owner-
managers want the family firm to remain in the family.
The easiest way to achieve this goal is to make sure
that no equity is sold to non-family parties. In practice,
however, this goal might be harder to achieve because
two types of family firm succession events are
possible: (1) planned succession and (2) unplanned
succession. A planned succession event is one where
the incumbent plans to retire at some future point. An
unplanned succession event is one where the incum-
bent has to be replaced due to an unforeseen event such
as a serious accident, illness or death. Proper succes-
sion planning considers both types of events. To deal
with unforeseen events the manager-owner could buy
an insurance policy that would provide funds to a
family trust. The family trust would then provide a
loan to the successor and a reasonable income to the
spouse. We also expect that the intention to use debt
financing is associated with succession experience.
For example, it is often the case that the owner-
manager has been involved in a family firm succession
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as the successor. We expect that the insight the
incumbent has gained during such succession experi-
ence will be related to the intention to use debt in a
future family firm succession.
2.2 A conceptual model of succession financing
in family firms
The previous section makes it clear that the current
owner-manager plays a central role in succession
planning, identifying a successor, organizing the
financial aspects of the transfer, and, finally, passing
on the family business. Because this paper focuses on
succession within the family, the owner-manager is
expected to remain more closely linked to the family
business than would be the case if the business were
sold to a third party. In this situation, most succession
financing decisions are expected to be influenced by
the owner-manager’s personal characteristics, such as
his/her attitude to debt, his/her risk propensity, his/her
financial knowledge, and his/her experience with debt.
In addition, personal succession-related factors, such
as the need for family control, succession planning and
succession experience, are expected to influence
financing decisions.
Our overall model is presented in Fig. 1. In this
model, the need for family control provides a measure
of the family social norms toward business succession
because it reflects the expectations of the other family
members regarding the succession outcome. Further-
more, the future succession financing decision may be
subject to obstacles that are outside of the owner-
manager’s sphere of influence. Accordingly, our
conceptual model accounts for feasibility consider-
ations. That is, we incorporate a set of firm character-
istics as controls in our conceptual model that may
impede the owner-manager’s decision-making free-
dom. For example, low firm profitability or high firm
growth will limit the family firm’s self-financing
capability. In these sorts of cases, the owner-manager
would likely be forced to utilize external financing
and, consequently, would show a greater intention to
engage in debt when financing succession-related
expenditures.3 Finally, we include other financing
intentions in our model as additional controls to
account for possible interdependencies between dif-
ferent financial sources for succession financing. Next,
we develop our hypotheses in greater detail.
2.2.1 General personal factors
2.2.1.1 Attitude toward debt Taking a social and
behavioral science perspective on decision-making, an
individual’s attitude toward a certain behavior
represents the most researched construct that
determines behavioral choices. Attitudes reflect an
individual’s positive or negative evaluation of the
expected outcomes from the decision in question
(Ajzen 1991). Indeed, strategic decision-making tasks
in family firms are found to be significantly influenced
by the owner-manager’s attitudes (Heck 2004). With
regard to financial choices, a family firm’s owner-
managers are found to hold distinctive attitudes
toward financing strategies (Lo´pez-Gracia and
Sa´nchez-Andu´jar 2007), which cause financial
decisions to follow a peculiar financial logic (Gallo
et al. 2004). This financial logic reflects both economic
and non-economic considerations (e.g., Go´mez-Mejı´a
et al. 2001). For example, the owner-manager may
evaluate how a specific financial source will affect the
distribution of profits to the family, the firm’s cost of
capital, the firm’s future growth prospects, the
family’s reputation or the private benefits of control.
It is the sum of these expectations that will then form
his or her financial attitude.
Family firms’ owner-managers usually hold very
favorable attitudes toward internal financial sources
such as retained profits or family wealth. However,
regarding external financing, owner-managers com-
monly possess more positive attitudes toward debt
financing than toward external equity financing
(Romano et al. 2001). To date, research on decision-
making has consistently found that an individual’s
attitude is a significant predictor of behavioral inten-
tions. In general, a more favorable attitude towards a
behavior should lead to a stronger intention to perform
the behavior (Ajzen 1991). Following multiple studies
that have shown the validity of the general attitude-
intention relationship in various business and non-
business contexts (e.g., Armitage and Conner 2001),
we expect that this relationship will also apply
to the succession financing context. Accordingly, we
hypothesize the following:
3 However, these variables will not be discussed in more detail
as our paper focuses on the individual-level determinants of
family firm financing.
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H1 A more favorable owner-manager’s attitude
toward debt financing is positively related to the
intention to use debt for succession financing.
2.2.1.2 Risk propensity Decision making in family
firms is significantly influenced by the owner-manager’s
perception of the risk associated with the decision
(Claver et al. 2008). In turn, risk perceptions are
influenced by an individual’s risk propensity (Sitkin
and Weingart 1995). An individual’s risk propensity
describes his or her tendency to take or avoid risk (Sitkin
and Pablo 1992). Accordingly, risk propensity is a
central personal disposition in the decision-making
process (e.g., Mullins and Forlani 2005) that partic-
ularly affects financial decision making in close,
privately held firms (Michaelas et al. 1998). Although
the risk propensity in family firms is subjective and may
vary depending on the owner-managers’ characteristics
(Jones et al. 2008), recent research suggests that family
firm owner-managers generally show a high level of risk
aversion (e.g., McConaughy et al. 2001; Mishra and
McConaughy 1999). Individuals with a lower risk
propensity (risk avoiders or risk averse) perceive the
risks associated with a particular decision option to be
higher than those individuals who have higher risk
propensities (risk seekers). Therefore, those who are
more risk averse choose less risky options (Mullins and
Forlani 2005).
The succession process is typically risky for family
firms and the owning family because a succession
failure risks the loss of family control and family
wealth. Financing decisions can add to these risks. For
example, utilizing debt is closely related to the
bankruptcy risk of a firm (Parsons and Titman 2008),
especially when existing debt levels are high or
excessive. Thus, raising debt increases the family’s
risk of losing both financial wealth (Blanco-Mazagatos
et al. 2007) and socio-emotional wealth (Go´mez-Mejı´a
et al. 2007). A high aversion to control risks is also
found to motivate a family firm’s owner-managers to
use less debt and to rely more on retained earnings
(Mishra and McConaughy 1999). Accordingly, family
firms may mitigate succession-related risks by employ-
ing less risky forms of financing, such as retained
earnings and/or family wealth. However, we argue that
owner-managers who are more risk averse will perceive
that the risk of using debt for succession financing is
high. Conversely, owner-managers who are risk takers
General personal factors
Attitude toward debt
Risk propensity
Financial knowledge
Experience with debt
Succession-related
personal factors
Need for family control
Succession planning
Succession experience
Controls
Size, Growth, Profitability,
Ownership dispersion,
Advisory board
Succession financing:
Intention to use debt
Feasibility items
Desirability items
Controls
Intention to use family wealth
Intention to use retained earnings
Intention to use external equity
Other financial sources
Fig. 1 Conceptual model
of succession financing
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will not regard debt financing as overwhelmingly risky
and are thus more likely to engage in debt financing
within the succession process. We therefore hypothe-
size the following:
H2 A higher owner-manager’s risk propensity is
positively related to the intention to use debt for
succession financing.
2.2.1.3 Financial knowledge The knowledge and
knowledge accumulation of the owner-managers
represent a special resource for family firms (Cabrera-
Sua´rez et al. 2001; Habbershon et al. 2003); both are
significant components of effective decision making
(Jensen and Meckling 1992). Specialized knowledge
allows individuals to identify, solve, or even predict and
anticipate problems in a specific domain (Leonard and
Sensiper 1998). Specialized knowledge permits a
reduction in uncertainty (Beijerse 1999) and remedies
the effects of bounded rationality on decision making
(March and Simon 1958). As such, the need for using
decision heuristics is reduced, thus alleviating the
occurrence of decision biases and, consequently,
improving the decision-making quality.
Similarly, financial knowledge is a critical factor
within financial decision-making because capital acqui-
sitions are directly affected by the level of financial
information available to and known by the owner-
manager (Van Auken 2001). Research shows that
limited knowledge of financing alternatives frequently
causes suboptimal financing decisions (Seghers et al.
2012). For example, the decision of a family firm to
borrow money is found to be influenced by the owner-
manager’s knowledge about the types and the functions
of the available financial resources (Michaelas et al.
1998). Succession may cause additional financial
demands for the owning family and the family firm
because of possible inheritance taxes, realignment
expenditures, or cash withdrawals to family members
who do not have a stake in the business (De Massis et al.
2008). These demands frequently require external
financing because the internal financial capacities of
the firm and the family are limited (Kimhi 1997). The
reluctance of family firms to use external financing is
partly due to ingrained, long-term prejudices and norms
maintained by the family (Gallo et al. 2004). An owner-
manager who possesses financial knowledge and skills
regarding available financial sources, financial con-
tracting and the functioning of financial sources and
capital markets is better able to realize the value of
external financial sources for the business and to
overcome ingrained prejudices against debt. Further-
more, the more an owner-manager knows about the
types and functions of existing financial products and
financial institutions, the less dependent the owner-
manager is likely to be on the traditionally used
financial sources such as internal finances or family
wealth. Additionally, increased financial knowledge
should increase a firm’s internal financial planning and
monitoring activities, which are likely to result in less
demand for monitoring rights by potential lenders.
Therefore, we suggest that owner-managers with
increased financial knowledge will be more open to
debt financing and, therefore, more likely to use debt
for succession financing. Thus, we hypothesize the
following:
H3 An increased level in the owner-manager’s
financial knowledge will be positively related to the
intention to use debt for succession financing.
2.2.1.4 Experience with debt In the absence of
perfect information, decisions must, at least in part,
be based on prior experiences and judgments (Simon
1987). Prior experience represents part of an
individual’s knowledge (Jensen and Meckling 1992).
However, knowledge gained from experience is
clearly distinct from knowledge acquired through
education or training, as similar experiences do not
always lead to similar increases in knowledge
(Quinones et al. 1995). A general research finding is
that experienced individuals utilize richer decision-
making and problem-solving strategies and are better
able to evaluate the appropriateness of those strategies
(Johnson 1988). Additionally, experience is most
beneficial in less structured and more complex
decision contexts (Abdolmohammadi and Wright
1987), such as succession planning or succession
financing. However, experienced decision makers
have the tendency to become increasingly channeled
by their past experiences (Shepherd et al. 2003), which
makes it difficult for them to recognize new variables
and situational changes (Tversky and Kahneman
1974). Accordingly, past experience with financing
options and the behavior of financial suppliers is likely
to create expectations about the future behavior of
these financial suppliers. These expectations, in turn,
will direct future financial decisions in family firms.
Succession financing in family firms 321
123
Indeed, the owner-managers that have favorable prior
experiences with debt financing are found to be less
cautious about raising debt, whereas owner-managers
with negative prior experiences are less likely to
engage in new debt financing (Michaelas et al. 1998).
An owner-manager’s positive experience with debt
may be the result of favorable credit conditions, credit
acceptance or the general behavior of financial
institutions in prior years. Consequently, we argue
that owner-managers who have had positive expe-
riences with debt suppliers in the past will likely utilize
debt for financing succession-related expenditures.
Therefore, we hypothesize the following:
H4 Stronger positive experiences with debt suppli-
ers will be positively related to the intention to use
debt for succession financing.
2.2.2 Succession-related personal factors
2.2.2.1 Need for family control A narrow definition
of a family firm typically includes the owner-
manager’s desire for a generational transfer of the
firm within the family (e.g., Barach and Ganitsky
1995). Indeed, the wish to keep the firm within the
family is the most important driver of succession
activities (e.g., Sharma et al. 2003b). The need to
maintain control of the family business is likely to
increase when the family expresses their commitment
and loyalty to the business, when they demonstrate
pride in the business or when there are family
members who are willing to continue the business.
The evolving need for family control reflects a specific
social norm that is likely to affect the owner-
manager’s decision making (Pearson et al. 2008).
There are numerous reasons for a family to retain
control of a business, and these reasons include factors
like the private benefits of control, such as amenity
potential or reputational considerations, or the
maintenance of an income source for the family
(Go´mez-Mejı´a et al. 2007; Burkart et al. 2003).
Accordingly, a greater need for family control
should increase the engagement of an owner-
manager in succession management activities such
as succession planning.
Furthermore, the need to maintain control within
the family directly affects the owner-manager’s
financing decisions (e.g., Romano et al. 2001).
Empirical studies on family firm financing generally
reason that a high need for family control is the major
cause of an owner-manager’s aversion to external
financing (e.g., Mishra and McConaughy 1999; Gallo
et al. 2004). For example, the use of debt financing for
succession-related expenditures may affect family
control because debt suppliers frequently require
control and monitoring rights. In addition, the greater
leverage increases the firm’s bankruptcy risk, which
can result in a complete loss of family wealth and
control. Therefore, we argue that in family firms with a
strong desire to maintain family control, owner-
managers will prefer internal rather than external
financing for succession-related expenditures.
Accordingly, we hypothesize the following:
H5 A greater need for family control will be
negatively related to the intention to use debt for
succession financing.
2.2.2.2 Succession experience Previous succession
experience has been recognized as an important
determinant of a family firm’s succession performance
(Le Breton-Miller et al. 2004). Astrachan, Klein and
Smyrnios (2002) regard a family firm’s succession
experience as occurring on an exponential continuum.
Each successful succession adds valuable experience to
the family and to the firm (Cabrera-Sua´rez et al. 2001).
Empirical data on succession failure among family firms
verifies the positive influence of previous succession
experience on succession performance; although only
30 % of family firms survive the first generation, 50 %
of these second-generation family firms survive the
subsequent succession process and reach the third
generation (Miller et al. 2003). Accordingly, if owner-
managers have already experienced a succession
process, it is likely that they are more aware of the
difficulties and problems that may occur during the
succession process. For example, they may be more
likely to anticipate succession expenditures that arise
from sibling conflicts. Additionally, they may be more
likely to engage in financial planning activities, such as
an accumulation of family wealth or a steady increase in
the firm’s internal financing capacity, both of which
reduce the need for external financing during the
succession process. Furthermore, research indicates
that descendants are less inclined and less willing to
bear business risks compared with their parents (e.g.,
Kaye and Hamilton 2004), which may also lead to a
decreased utilization of debt. In addition, later-
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generation family firms exhibit increased loss aversion,
goal misalignment and intra-family conflicts that also
reduce the use of debt (Schulze et al. 2003). We
therefore argue that owner-managers who have already
experienced a succession are less likely to use debt for
succession financing. Accordingly, we hypothesize the
following:
H6 Succession experience will be negatively related
to the intention to use debt for succession financing.
2.2.2.3 Succession planning Researchers have long
emphasized the importance of succession planning for
ensuring the continuity and prosperity of family firms
(e.g., Brockhaus 2004). Despite this emphasis,
succession planning appears to be left to chance by
many family firms (e.g., Sharma et al. 2000), primarily
because the owner-manager is resistant to succession
planning (Ibrahim et al. 2001). This aversion may
result from the negative emotions that occur when
faced with his or her own mortality (Lansberg 1988).
Succession planning—tacit or formal—involves all of
the actions that are necessary for transferring
leadership and ownership (Le Breton-Miller et al.
2004). Among those actions are successor selection
and training, the steps of leadership transfer,
compensation payment planning, and tax planning
(e.g., Lansberg 1988).
Succession-planning activities may affect succes-
sion-related financial needs in different ways. First,
when owner-managers engage in planning early, they
can pursue activities that will reduce the need for
external financing, such as an ongoing transfer of
ownership during the owner-manager’s lifetime.
However, family firms are likely to need outside
financing as a part of the succession process (De
Massis et al. 2008). In this way, deliberate succession
planning may enable the owner-manager to foresee the
need for external financing during succession.
Because debt is preferred to equity financing in family
firms (e.g., Romano et al. 2001), succession planning
may increase the owner-manager’s intention to use
debt financing for succession-expenditures. Further-
more, succession planning may include tax planning.
It is widely accepted that debt carries tax benefits
(Modigliani and Miller 1963), and family firms are
known to develop financial strategies to reduce their
tax burden (Haynes et al. 1999). Indeed, research
shows that planning increases the likelihood that
family firms will use debt financing (Romano et al.
2001). Accordingly, we argue that owner-managers
who are actively engaged in succession planning will
use debt financing to reduce the expected tax burden.
We therefore hypothesize the following:
H7 Succession planning will be positively related to
the intention to use debt for succession financing.
3 Methodology
3.1 Sample
The data of this study were gathered via a mailed
survey in 2008, which is a common method for
obtaining data in family firm research (e.g., Eddleston
and Kellermanns 2007). The initial sample was drawn
from the Hoppenstedt database, the largest database on
German companies. Smaller companies, referred to as
life-style businesses (Schulze et al. 2003), are likely to
be faced with low succession-related expenditures
and, consequently, should have only minor needs
for external financing. We therefore included only
firms with minimum sales of EUR 700,000 in 2007
(approximately U.S. $1 million) in our sample.
To determine whether a firm is a family firm, we
used the power subscale of the F-PEC scale to assess
the influence of the family over the firm (Klein et al.
2005). Consistent with Klein et al. (2005), we
analyzed the family’s ownership, family management,
and family board positions for the firms by combining
information from the Hoppenstedt database with that
from the Creditreform and Bu¨rgel company databases
and by reviewing the relevant sections from company
web pages (i.e., ‘about us’ or ‘firm history’). We
randomly selected 2,200 firms and sent them a
questionnaire with a personalized cover letter to the
owner-manager and an addressed return envelope.
After three reminders, a total of 362 questionnaires
were received. The response rate of 16.5 % is similar
to that of other recent studies on family firms in
Germany (e.g., Pieper et al. 2008). However, because
some questionnaires were deemed unusable due to
missing data, our final sample included 187 German
family firms. Accordingly, we checked for potential
differences between our initial sampling and the
sample to be used in the study, applying an ANOVA.
We did not identify any statistically significant
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differences between the two samples with regard to
firm age, size, industry, growth or profitability.
Because the variables in our study came from
answers that were provided by a single respondent,
common method variance may have affected our
empirical results. Following Podsakoff et al. (2003),
we assured the respondents of the confidentiality of
their answers to reduce any evaluation apprehension,
separated the measurement of the predictor and
criterion variables, counterbalanced the question
order, and improved our scale items (as suggested by
Tourangeau et al. 2000). Additionally, a confirmatory
factor analysis was conducted to identify if there was
any common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003). We
controlled for common method variance by explicitly
incorporating the effects of a latent method factor on
each observed item. The shared variance in our model
is 0.09 %. Thus, this test provided no evidence for a
common method bias in our data. Additionally, we
tested for potential non-respondent bias in our study.
As late respondents are considered more similar to
non-respondents (Kanuk and Berenson 1975), we
divided our data into early and late respondents
depending on when the questionnaires were received.
We analyzed the differences between early and late
respondents using an ANOVA, a method that earlier
research suggests is appropriate when data from non-
respondents is not available (e.g., Eddleston et al.
2008). However, we did not observe any statistically
significant differences between the two groups, indi-
cating that non-response bias is not a problem in our
study.
3.2 Measurements
Most of the variables in this study were measured
using adapted versions of scales and measures from
previous studies. We assessed content and internal
validity through expert interviews and conducted a
pilot study with eight owner-managers of family
firms. Before sending out the final questionnaires
problematic items were identified and re-worded or
deleted based on feedback from consultants that
specialize in family businesses and from the
participants in the pilot study. The measurement
scales of all multi-item constructs used in this study
exceeded the 0.7 threshold for Cronbach’s Alpha
and, thus, demonstrated satisfactory reliability
(Nunally 1978).
3.2.1 Independent variables
First, this study includes a variety of general personal
factors that were predicted to influence succession
financing. These factors are measured as follows.
Attitude is commonly assessed with items that are
related to the overall favorable or unfavorable assess-
ment of the behavior in question, which is captured by
such attribute dimensions as good–bad, harmful–
beneficial, pleasant–unpleasant, or likeable–dislike-
able (Ajzen 2001). Accordingly, we measured an
owner-manager’s attitude toward debt financing with
four items, which included the evaluative adjectives
good, useful, beneficial, and wise. Each item was
measured using a seven-point Likert scale that ranged
from strongly disagree (=1) to strongly agree (=7).
The items were averaged to yield an attitude score
(a = 0.94).
An individual’s risk propensity reflects his or her
tendency to take or avoid risk (Sitkin and Pablo 1992).
Risk propensity is context-related and may vary within
different decision-making areas (Sitkin and Weingart
1995). As this study addresses financial decision
making, we used a measure for financial risk-taking
propensity. Following earlier research (Mullins and
Forlani 2005), risk propensity was operationalized
using an adapted version of the Risk Style Scale
(Schneider and Lopes 1986). The number of lottery
choices was summed up as a risk propensity indicator
that ranged from 0 to 5.
Research on individual knowledge distinguishes
between objective knowledge—accurately stored
information, and subjective knowledge—beliefs about
the state of knowledge (e.g., Moorman et al. 2004).
Specifically, this study assesses the family firm owner-
manager’s financial knowledge as the amount of
accurately stored financial information. Previous
studies have measured the level of objective knowl-
edge through a series of domain-specific questions
(e.g., Moorman et al. 2004). Similarly, financial
knowledge in our study was measured by a knowledge
quiz that included six propositions related to business
financing with different levels of difficulty. A sample
proposition is ‘‘Trade credit financing can easily cost a
yearly interest rate of 30 % or more.’’ The respondents
were asked to indicate if they agree or disagree to the
respective proposition. The number of correct answers
was summed up as a financial knowledge indicator
that ranged from 0 to 6.
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Financial experience is acquired over time. It
reflects an individual’s positive and negative appraisal
of the outcomes of relationships with capital suppliers.
Particularly positive experiences may affect future
financial decisions. Because our study is focused on
debt financing, we used a single item to measure the
individual’s experience with debt in terms of his/her
prior positive experience with debt suppliers using a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to
7 = strongly agree).
This research also included succession process-
related factors. The need for family control may
manifest itself in the attitudes of the owner-manager or
the family’s approach toward family members that
work, manage, and/or own the firm. We measured the
need for family control with a previously validated
three-item scale that considers the variety of forms that
family control may take (Smyrnios et al. 1998). For
example, one item was, ‘‘Family ownership and
control is important when considering senior appoint-
ments.’’ These items were measured using a seven-
point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 =
strongly agree) and were averaged to yield a need
for family control score (a = 0.71).
Succession experience enhances the family firm’s
and its owner-manager’s knowledge of the succession
process. Because this experience is an exponential
continuum for the firm (Astrachan et al. 2002), it was
measured by the natural log of the number of
succession events experienced by the owning family
(?1) to capture the logic of the learning curve.
Succession planning involves a broad variety of
different actions, such as developing a formal succes-
sion plan, selecting a successor, and selecting a
retirement date (e.g., Lansberg 1988). Succession
planning was assessed using a dichotomous variable
that was assigned a value of 1 if the respondent
indicated that at least one succession-planning activity
had already been initiated.
3.2.2 Dependent variable
Intention reflects an individual’s plan to perform a
particular behavior in the future (Ajzen 1991). We
evaluated the respondent’s intentions to finance suc-
cession expenditures with debt using a dichotomous
item. Dichotomous dependent variables are common
in entrepreneurship and family firm research (e.g.,
Blanco-Mazagatos et al. 2007; Riding et al. 2012).
Within the succession process, debt can be raised by
the firm, the incumbent or the successor. The depen-
dent variable was assigned a 1 if the respondent
indicated he or she planned to use debt for succession
financing; this debt could be raised by the firm, the
incumbent and/or the successor. This variable was
assigned a 0 if there was no plan to use debt.
3.2.3 Control variables
We employed five feasibility controls in our analysis.
First, we controlled for firm-specific variables to
account for factors that could impede the feasibility of
a desired behavioral choice. Specifically, we included
firm size, growth, profitability and ownership disper-
sion in our analyses because these variables have been
found to influence family firm financing behavior
(e.g., Romano et al. 2001; Gallo et al. 2004; Blanco-
Mazagatos et al. 2007; Schulze et al. 2003). Growth
was a self-reported measure of the family firm’s 3-year
average sales growth (2004–2007), size was opera-
tionalized using the natural logarithm of net sales in
2007, and profitability was assessed by the firm’s
return on assets (ROA) in 2007 (e.g., Blanco-Maza-
gatos et al. 2007). Ownership dispersion was measured
by the number of a firm’s shareholders. Lastly, our
research assumes that the existence of an advisory
board influences the succession processes (e.g., Chit-
toor and Das 2007). We assigned a 1 if the respondent
indicated that the firm had established an advisory
board. In addition, it is very likely that family firms
would use multiple financial sources for any succes-
sion expenditures. Research results suggest that family
firms prefer to use internal finance (i.e., family wealth
and retained earnings), followed by external debt, with
external equity used only as a last resort (e.g., Gallo
et al. 2004). In light of these findings, our model
controlled for any plans to use other financial sources
for succession financing by incorporating the intention
to use (a) family wealth, (b) retained earnings, and
(c) external equity.
4 Analyses and results
4.1 Main analysis
Given that our dependent variable, the intention to use
debt for succession financing, is a dichotomous
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variable, binary logistic regression was used to
analyze the obtained data. The data analysis was
performed using PASW Statistics 18.
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations for
our independent and dependent variables are pre-
sented in Table 1. The correlations between the
independent variables are below the critical values
that would indicate serious multi-collinearity prob-
lems in the data (Hair et al. 1998). Prior to the binary
logistic regression analysis, a further investigation of
mean values and correlations revealed some interest-
ing findings. First, 34 % of family firms intend to use
debt financing for succession expenditures. However,
it is more common for the owner-managers to intend to
use family wealth and retained earnings, the latter
being strongly, negatively correlated to the intention
to use debt financing. The owner-manager’s attitude
toward debt is neutral and positively correlated with
his or her financial knowledge, debt usage experience
and the size of the firm. Moreover, the existence of an
advisory board is positively correlated with an owner-
manager’s attitude toward debt and with the number of
shareholders. In our sample, only 69 % were already
engaged in succession-planning activities. More inter-
estingly, succession experience and succession plan-
ning are not significantly correlated to each other.
Last, nearly all of the owner-managers appeared to be
averse to financial risks because our descriptive results
indicate a very low average risk propensity score
of 1.1.
The results of our binary logistic regression anal-
yses are presented in Table 2. We used five different
models to test the robustness of our estimates and to
investigate each factor group’s contribution to the
conceptual model’s explanatory power. First, we
entered the firm variables and the intentions to use
other financial sources as controls (Model 1). Subse-
quently, we added the general personal factors into
Model 2. To analyze our full conceptual model, the
succession-related personal factors were entered into
Model 3. Finally, we split our sample according to the
planned date of succession (less than 10 years or 10 or
more years) and repeated our analysis (Models 4 and
5). Following previous exploratory studies (e.g.,
Ucbasaran et al. 2003), we attempted to avoid Type
II errors. Accordingly, we selected 0.1 as the level of
significance in our analyses. The results from Model 1
through Model 3 are presented next; the split sample
analysis (Models 4 and 5) is presented in Sect. 4.2.
All of our models were statistically significant and
showed a good fit to the data as indicated by the Hosmer
and Lemeshow tests, with p-values being greater than
0.05 (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Before testing our
hypotheses, our control variables were entered into
Model 1. Model 1 achieved statistical significance with
an explained variance of 28.5 % (Nagelkerke’s R2). To
test our hypotheses, we first entered only the general
personal factors for Model 2 and subsequently tested
our full conceptual model by adding the hypothesized
succession-related personal factors for Model 3. The
inclusion of general personal factors significantly
improved our model (Dv2 = 17.113, p \ 0.01). Model
2 explains 38.1 % of the dependent variable’s variance.
Our full conceptual model (Model 3) achieved statis-
tical significance with an explained variance of 46.6 %.
The inclusion of succession-related personal factors led
to a significant improvement in the model (Dv2 =
19.490, p \ 0.01). The predictive accuracy of Model 3
was 78.6 %.
The first set of hypotheses investigated the influ-
ence of general personal factors on the owner-
manager’s intention to use debt for financing succes-
sion expenditures. Our hypotheses were mainly sup-
ported by our results. First, it was predicted that the
owner-manager’s attitude toward debt would posi-
tively influence the intention to use debt. Indeed, the
attitude toward debt (b = 0.275, p \ 0.10) was found
to be significant and positively related to a person’s
intention to use debt for succession financing, thus
supporting Hypothesis 1. However, Hypothesis 2 was
not supported by our data. An owner-manager’s risk
propensity had a positive, but not significant, effect on
the intention to use debt for succession financing
(b = 0.123, n.s.). Hypothesis 3 proposed that the level
of the owner-manager’s financial knowledge would be
related to his/her intention to use debt financing for
succession expenditures. Our results revealed a strong
and positive relationship between financial knowledge
(b = 0.414, p \ 0.01) and the intention to use debt.
Additionally, Hypothesis 4, which stated that the
strength of positive debt experiences would be related
to the owner-manager’s debt usage intention, was not
supported by our analysis. The level of positive
experience with debt (b = 0.226, n.s.) was not
significantly related to an owner-manager’s intention
to use debt financing. The inclusion of the general
personal factors increased our model’s explained
variance by 9.6 %.
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The second set of hypotheses explored the influence
of succession-related personal factors on debt use
intention for succession financing. First, Hypothesis 5,
which postulated that a greater desire for family
control would be associated with the debt usage
intention of a family firm’s owner-manager, was not
supported by our data (b = -0.223, n.s.). However,
the expected negative relationship between prior
succession experience and the intention to use debt
financing for succession expenditures (Hypothesis 6)
was strongly supported by our data analysis (b =
-1.293, p \ 0.01). Finally, Hypothesis 7 predicted a
relationship between succession-planning activities
and the intention to use debt. Here, we found support
for a positive relationship between succession-plan-
ning activities (b = 1.069, p \ 0.05) and the intention
to use debt for succession financing. Adding the
succession-related personal variables to our model
increased the explained variance by 8.6 %. Finally, we
have to acknowledge the influence of the firm’s
control variables on the debt usage intention. The
firm’s growth had a strong and positive effect
(b = 0.051, p \ 0.01) on an owner-manager’s inten-
tion to use debt, whereas the firm’s profitability and
ownership dispersion were found to have a negative
effect (b = -0.023, p \ 0.05 and b = -0.257,
p \ 0.10). Additionally, the intention to use retained
earnings and external equity were significantly related
to our dependent variable: while the intention to use
retained earnings had a strong negative effect (b =
-1.757, p \ 0.001), the intention to use external
equity was found to have a significant and positive
effect (b = 1.926, p \ 0.05).
4.2 Split sample analysis
Intentions are generally accepted as valid predictors of
future behavior (e.g., Armitage and Conner 2001;
Ajzen et al. 2009). However, it is possible that actual
behavioral decisions will be different from an indi-
vidual’s behavioral intentions, particularly when the
actual behavior is in the distant future. We therefore
divided our sample into two groups: one group is
likely to perceive the succession as more pressing,
while the other group is likely to perceive the decision
as being further in the future. Following conventional
wisdom, succession planning must begin at least
10 years in advance to ensure a smooth transition. We
thus set the split date at 10 years and repeated our
conceptual model. Model 4 shows the results for the
sample group that expects succession to occur in less
than 10 years, while Model 5 shows the results for the
group of family firms that assumes succession will
take place in 10 or more years. Both models were
statistically significant, showed a good fit to the data
and had a high predictive accuracy (80.7 and 79.8 %).
The explained variance was 51.4 % (Model 4) and
54.4 % (Model 5). The results of our split sample
analysis largely support our findings. In both groups,
succession experience negatively influences our
dependent variable. For those firms that are likely to
perceive succession to be more pressing, the individ-
ual’s attitude is a more prominent predictor of the debt
usage intention (Model 4). In contrast, financial
knowledge was a major influence on the intention to
use debt for succession financing in the other group.
The statistical insignificance of succession planning in
our split sample analysis can be explained by missing
variance.
5 Discussion, implications, and limitations
Business succession is a challenging event. Poor
succession planning and succession financing choices
can result in the firm’s failure. However, family firms
cannot avoid succession because its occurrence is
driven by the owner-manager’s biological clock
(Lansberg 1999). This study attempted to extend
previous research on family firm succession by
developing and empirically testing a conceptual model
of succession financing behavior. Although succession
financing represents a significant precondition for the
successful intergenerational transfer of family firms
(De Massis et al. 2008), this study is, to the best of our
knowledge, the first of its kind. We relied on insights
from social psychology, corporate finance, and suc-
cession research, to study the owner-manager’s inten-
tion to use debt for financing succession expenditures.
The empirical results of our study provide support
for the multi-dimensional analyses of succession
issues in family firms because we found significant
relationships between the intention to use debt
financing, general personal factors, succession-related
personal factors, and firm factors. Accordingly, our
results contribute to the existing empirical research on
family firm succession because these studies usually
include only individual or firm factors in their analyses
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(for a review see, e.g., Chittoor and Das 2007).
Additionally, our findings are also important for
research on general family firm financing behavior
because little is known about how and why family
firms utilize particular financial resources (Blanco-
Mazagatos et al. 2007).
To date, the determinants most studied in the
context of succession are the incumbent’s personal
characteristics and relationships with the other family
members (e.g., Barach and Ganitsky 1995; Cabrera-
Sua´rez et al. 2001). Consistent with the arguments
developed earlier, we found that attitudes toward debt
and financial knowledge are significant predictors of
the owner-manager’s intention to use debt financing.
This finding contributes to the resource-based view of
the family firm (e.g., Cabrera-Sua´rez et al. 2001)
because it highlights the importance of knowledge and
knowledge accumulation as a key resource for family
firms. Moreover, these findings underline the decisive
role of knowledge in decision-making tasks in family
firms because knowledge appears to allow owner-
managers to overcome existing prejudices against
external finance, particularly with respect to debt. This
finding is especially noteworthy because family firms
are known to forego growth opportunities rather than
use external financing, which is a choice that can
impede the firm’s future performance (e.g., Gallo et al.
2004). Although risk propensity is a key personality
trait in entrepreneurship research (e.g., Mullins and
Forlani 2005), we did not find significant support for a
positive relationship between individual risk propen-
sity and an owner-manager’s intention to use debt
financing. This finding may result from the general
financial risk aversion of a family firm’s owner-
managers.
Furthermore, we found that succession process-
related factors impact the owner-manager’s intention
to use debt financing for succession expenditures. In
particular, succession experience was found to be a
strong determinant. Previous succession experience
generates knowledge that allows the owner-manager
to foresee potential problems and related expenditures
that will arise with the succession. Thus, anticipatory
decisions become possible, which, in the long term,
limits the succession-related expenditures and thus the
need for external financial sources. Limiting expendi-
tures, in turn, facilitates the succession process
because a family firm’s owner-managers are found
to be averse to external financing (e.g., Gallo et al.
2004). Thus, we add to the existing succession
literature that highlights the importance of experience
for succession performance (e.g., Le Breton-Miller
et al. 2004). Moreover, we found succession planning
to be a significant determinant of the debt use
intention. Planning increases the succession process’s
transparency and may reveal potential succession-
related expenditures in advance. More interestingly,
succession experience and succession planning were
not significantly correlated. Accordingly, having
experienced a succession did not mean that family
firm owner-managers were engaged in succession-
planning activities. However, the timely engagement
in succession-planning activities may prevent any
negative effects from unforeseen events, such as the
owner-manager’s unexpected death. This finding is
particularly noteworthy because it highlights that the
emotional aspects related to succession, such as being
faced with one’s own mortality (Lansberg 1988), may
increase the owner-manager’s resistance to engaging
in succession management activities, such as succes-
sion planning. This resistance, in turn, influences
succession performance, particularly in later genera-
tional transfers where formal succession planning is a
critical factor due to increased firm complexity.
Finally, three of our firm-specific controls were
found to significantly influence the owner-manager’s
intention to use debt for succession financing. In
particular, a firm’s growth and profitability affect
succession-financing decisions. Both higher growth
and lower profitability are likely to force the owner-
manager to use external debt financing because of
limited self-generated financial capacity (Kimhi
1997). Accordingly, firm variables affect the feasibil-
ity of certain financial behaviors. In addition, our
findings suggest that family firms exhibit financial
behavior that is consistent with the Pecking Order
hypothesis (Lo´pez-Gracia and Sa´nchez-Andu´jar
2007). However, when adopting a broader perspective
on our findings, we find that individual-level factors
(including financial intentions) are the most important
determinants of succession financing decisions,
accounting for approximately 75 % of the conceptual
model’s explained variance.
The results from our study also have practical
implications. First, as indicated by our descriptive
results, only one-third of all family firms intend to
engage in debt financing for succession, while the
anecdotal evidence suggests that most family firms
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will need debt financing to successfully pass the baton
(L-Bank 2006). Family firm owner-managers should,
therefore, be aware of the existing discrepancy
between their expectations and the probable reality
and be prepared to adjust their intentions accordingly.
Moreover, family firm owner-managers should engage
in succession-planning activities because these activ-
ities may help to determine the amount of financing
needed or even reduce the expenditures by leading the
owner-managers to act on expectations. The value of
succession planning is of particular importance for
family firms because banks usually consider a family
firm’s succession-planning activities in their credit
scoring systems. Furthermore, a steady increase of
financial knowledge will improve the financial deci-
sion-making in family firms and may help to overcome
prejudices against certain categories of financing,
especially when succession is perceived to be well in
the future. Family firm owner-managers should also be
aware that their financial decisions are driven by their
attitudes. Negative attitudes toward debt may prevent
them from using debt financing even if debt is needed
for a successful generational transfer. Additionally,
debt suppliers should rethink today’s transaction-
oriented approach of doing business in favor of a more
relationship-based lending approach. This approach
can more positively affect the personal experience of a
family firm’s owner-manager because positive expe-
riences with debt and its suppliers can influence the
future financing decisions of family firms, particularly
when succession is perceived to be more pressing.
Lastly, policy makers and capital suppliers can
increase the likelihood of successful succession by
providing sufficient financial knowledge and appro-
priate information about the importance of succession-
management activities like succession planning.
There are a number of limitations in this study that
suggest avenues for future research. First, consistent
with prior research (e.g., Sharma et al. 2003b), this
study takes an owner-manager-centric view on suc-
cession-related decision-making tasks. However,
other stakeholders, especially other family members,
are important and must be considered when transfer-
ring power and ownership in family firms (e.g.,
Lansberg 1988; Stavrou 2003). To this end, recent
research indicates that succession outcomes are influ-
enced by relational issues such as conflicts between
family members (e.g., Eddleston and Kellermanns
2007). As these relational dimensions are not included
in our model, future research could significantly add to
our knowledge by including aspects of the predeces-
sor–successor relationship to the study of succession
financing. Furthermore, contrasting succession financ-
ing decisions with a numerical measure for existing
family wealth could enhance our conceptual model
because our results support the view that family firms
strive to use internal funding first. Second, because we
investigate behavioral intentions in this study, we may
face the problem of inflated intentions; it is always
possible that actual behavioral decisions will be
different from an individual’s behavioral intentions.
However, research consistently finds that behavioral
intentions are the most important predictor of future
behavior (Ajzen et al. 2009), such as the use of debt
(Grichnik et al. 2011). We therefore split our sample
into two groups to investigate the effect of succession
timing and found largely consistent results regarding
our core conclusion about which personal factors are
important in this context. However, future research
could enhance our knowledge by verifying our results
with a measure of actual behavior instead of behav-
ioral intentions. Third, our study relies on self-
reported data. Although objective measures of financ-
ing choices would have been desirable, we could not
obtain this information because the family firms in our
sample were not publicly traded. Furthermore,
because all information was obtained from a single
respondent, our study is exposed to the risk of common
method bias. However, after conducting a post hoc-
test for common method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003),
our analysis did not indicate any significant concerns.
Finally, our study employed a demand-side approach
to financing decisions by researching the behavior of
the family firm’s owner-manager. However, financial
decision-making in family firms might be constricted
due to supply-side behavior, such as credit rationing
by banks (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). On the one hand,
the likelihood of supply-side constraints is rather low
because our study was conducted prior to the credit
crunch and governmental and regulatory influence on
the banking system (Shin 2009). On the other hand, the
owner-manager’s intention to use debt financing and
the actual use of debt financing could be affected by
the successor’s ability to obtain debt financing from
banks. Therefore, future studies incorporating vari-
ables that reflect both demand- and supply-side
behavior would significantly add to our understanding
of financing behavior.
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6 Conclusions
In conclusion, our study provides the first conceptual
model of succession financing and a thorough empirical
analysis of the succession financing decisions of owner-
managers in family firms. Our results demonstrate that
general personal factors, succession-related personal
factors and firm factors impact the owner-manager’s
intentions and, thus, the likelihood of using debt for
succession financing. Specifically, the owner-man-
ager’s financial knowledge, attitude toward debt, suc-
cession planning, and prior succession experience are
found to determine succession-financing decisions.
Accordingly, to complement our work, future research
should continue to take a multi-dimensional perspective
on succession and incorporate personal relationship
issues into the analysis of succession financing.
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